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Currently, there is a great deal of interest in assessing the resilience of infrastructure systems.Muchof this interest stems
from the realisation that these systemsare notonly critical to civil defence but also, given the correct set of circumstances,
can fail catastrophically. Three case studies are presented that show how network theory, which has been successfully
applied to other fields, can also be used to help understand potential vulnerabilities in infrastructure systems. Through
these case studies it is shown that traditional network theory can be extended to analyse infrastructures that are large,
spatially distributed systems, or that carry flows of resources or are interconnected with other infrastructure systems.
These methods demonstrate how this approach can help infrastructure designers, owners and operators to make rapid
assessments of vulnerabilities in their systems and to identify components that aremore important to the functioning of
the these networks. Furthermore, this approach provides a basis for identifying and prioritising appropriatemeasures to
improve the reliability of infrastructure at the systems scale.
1. Introduction
Infrastructure systems, such as water, transport, communica-
tion and energy networks, are crucial to the functioning of a
modern society (Murray and Grubesic, 2007). The reliability
and integrity of these physical assets and the services they
provide is vital for ensuring national security, public health and
productivity (HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2011). As
society becomes more developed, they not only place greater
reliance on these systems but also become increasingly
complex, so they have the potential to create larger impacts
on both the environment that they are coupled to and the
socioeconomic changes that they (in part) enable. This
increased complexity and reliance is making these networked
infrastructure systems harder to manage (Royal Academy of
Engineering, 2011) as disruptive events can be propagated
between networks and thus spread their impact far beyond the
immediate footprint of a disturbance. For instance, the 2007
UK floods led to the inundation of energy and water facilities
in the flood plain. This subsequently led to a regional loss of
these services as well as the loss of electricity-dependent
information communication technology (ICT) networks and
reduced emergency response capacity as a result of transport
network disruption (Pitt, 2008). On 28 September 2003 in Italy,
a blackout that affected much of the country (Rosato et al.,
2008) was magnified by bi-directional interactions between
ICT and energy systems because the ICT systems required an
electricity supply, while power stations were dependent on the
communication systems for their operation (Buldyrev et al.,
2010).
Such events, that have manifested themselves over large spatial
areas and across infrastructure sectors, have highlighted the
importance of developing earth system engineering approaches
to improve the management and analysis of physical infra-
structure systems. Traditional approaches to engineering
design do not capture the necessary system scale behaviour,
requiring the development of new broad scale analyses that can
capture interactions between physical infrastructures and the
natural and social systems to which they are intrinsically
coupled. Network theory provides a rigorous mathematical
basis for the analysis of connected elements and enables aspects
of the aggregate performance of networked systems to be
rapidly calculated. It therefore has great potential as an earth
systems engineering tool.
Network models are increasingly being employed to help us
understand social (Amaral et al., 2000; Arenas et al. 2003;
Newman et al., 2002), neural (Sporns, 2002; Stam and
Reijneveld, 2007), biological (Rual et al., 2005) and computer
science networks (Valverde and Sole´, 2003). More recent work
has applied network theory to analyse infrastructure systems
(Holmgren, 2006; Lhomme et al., 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2012)
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and demonstrated their potential to support broad scale
infrastructure network design and management.
After a brief introduction to network theory, this paper presents
the results of three applications of network analysis to
demonstrate using the flexibility and scalability of the method
to understand a wide range of infrastructure problems. The first
case study subjects a spatial network to different hazards, aiming
to assess the resilience of the network to each hazard. The second
case study shows the role of supply and pipe (network edge)
resistances in mediating infrastructure performance. Finally, the
authors demonstrate how these approaches can be extended to
consider the implications of interdependencies between networks
before discussing the potential of network modelling for earth
systems engineering and for supporting the design and manage-
ment of infrastructure systems.
2. Network analysis and graph theory
systems for infrastructure
Network theory is an area of applied mathematics and part of
graph theory that concerns itself with the representation of
relations between discrete objects. Before describing how to
build a network model, it is useful to define some basic
terminology relevant to all the case studies. A network is a set
of items, referred to as nodes, which are connected by links.
There may be several types of node or link in a network with
differing properties. The degree of a node is the number of
connections it has with other nodes and the degree distribution
of a network is the probability distribution of these degrees
over the whole network (see Figures 1–3).
2.1 Infrastructure as a network
There has been a great deal of recent work using network theory
to analyse naturally occurring networks, including infrastruc-
ture systems. Most of this research has focused on defining the
degree distribution of the network by studying its nodal
connectivity and using this information to identify its network
class. In network theory there are four main classes of network,
each of which describes a different pattern of nodal connectivity
and has distinctive degree distributions, which are introduced
below. That many infrastructure networks fit into only a small
number of network classes may be surprising, as an airline
network appears to be significantly different from an electrical
power grid, but in fact they share similar characteristics.
The first documented network class was the random graph
model (Erdos and Renyi, 1960) (Figure 1). Although this type
of network has been shown to be a poor representation of real-
world network architectures (Newman, 2003), random net-
works are widely studied and, in part because nodes have a
similar degree that follows a Poisson distribution (Figure 1(b)),
are often used for comparison with more structured networks
(Batagelj and Brandes, 2005; Lewis, 2009) (Figure 1).
To model real-world systems more accurately, Watts and
Strogatz (1998) modified the random graph model using the
concept of six degrees of freedom (Milgram, 1967) to form
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Figure 1. (a) A sample random network and (b) the shape of its
degree distribution
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Figure 2. (a) A sample scale-free network and (b) its degree
distribution (plotted on a log–log axes)
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Figure 3. Degree distribution for the North American power grid: a
real-world example of an exponential network plotted on a log-y
axis (using data from Deng et al. 2007)
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small-world networks. The main characteristic of small-world
networks is that most nodal pairs are not directly connected,
but can be reached by way of traversing very few links. The
degree distribution is very similar to that of a random network
(Figure 1(b)) (Barthelemy, 2011). Small-world networks have
been shown to replicate a range of real-world networks,
including subway systems (Latora and Marchiori, 2002).
Many real-world networks (including the world wide web
(Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Barabasi et al., 2000)) tend to form
a power law degree distribution, more commonly known as a
scale-free network. These are characterised by a small number
of highly connected nodes (nodes with a high degree) and a
large number of poorly connected nodes (nodes with a small
degree), as shown in Figure 2.
Other real-world networks such as power grids have been
found to have an exponential degree distribution and are
termed exponential networks (Albert et al., 2004; Amaral et al.
2000; Bompard et al., 2011; Liu and Tang, 2005). The degree
distribution for an exponential network is shown in Figure 3.
Some real-world networks do not neatly fit one network class in
particular, as they include elements from several classes. Themost
well documented of these are air traffic networks (Figure 4(a)),
which include elements of both scale-free and exponential
network architectures. Their network architecture has been
classed as a truncated scale-free distribution (or a scale-free
distribution with an exponential tail) (Wilkinson et al., 2012).
The degree distribution of a network can also provide insight into
network resilience. For example, the architecture of scale-free
networks is such that they are quite resilient to random hazards
but vulnerable to targeted attack. This is because a random
hazard has a small chance of removing one of these few highly
connected nodes in the network, while a targeted attack will often
remove these nodes in seeking to cause maximum disruption to
the network (Albert et al., 2000).
2.2 Network model development
Transforming a real-world infrastructure network into a
network model and assessing its hazard tolerance can be
broken down into four steps.
Step 1 is to define basic network structure. This involves
abstracting the key features of the real-world infrastructure
system as a network model. According to the issue under
investigation or the availability of data, two approaches are
available. In case study 1 it is possible to apply (a), but for case
studies 2 and 3, where more general insights are sought, only
option (b) is applicable.
(a) When the analysis of the existing network is the only
objective, this is conceptually relatively straightforward:
components of an infrastructure system responsible for
consuming, generating or regulating a resource or service
are represented as nodes. Network links connect these
nodes if there is a mechanism for them to exchange their
resource or service. This might be a logical supply (e.g. a
communication signal) or a flow of resource (e.g. power,
water or vehicles).
(b) Frequently, it is of interest to analyse systems that are
representative of real-world networks in order to test the
resilience of alternative network structures and adapta-
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Figure 4. Graphs showing (a) the degree distribution and (b) the
spatial degree distribution for the North American air traffic network
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tions. If required, network generation algorithms
(described in detail by Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Erdos
and Renyi, 1960; Liu and Tang 2005; and Watts and
Strogatz, 1998) can be used to produce synthetic but
realistic networks according to rules that define properties
such as spatial distribution and connectivity.
Step 2 is to define component behaviour. Different infra-
structure systems, and indeed their individual components,
exhibit a range of engineering behaviour and subsequently
mediate the performance of the network. For example, pipes
and wires typically have varying capacities. Likewise, indivi-
dual structures have different supply capabilities, demands and
likelihoods of failure under extreme conditions. Network
models are flexible and can be parameterised to represent only
limited physical processes (e.g. a component is on or off), and
are therefore computationally very efficient, but they can also
incorporate detailed engineering behaviour. For example, in
case study 2 flow is introduced into a network model. This step
is crucial for the design of the network analysis as it is
important to provide enough detail to capture important
system behaviour for the issue under investigation, while
avoiding unnecessary complexity.
Step 3 is to subject the model to a series of disruptions. To
understand system performance it is crucial to analyse a series
of attack strategies that represent different possible hazards or
events. These could include random failures (e.g. correspond-
ing to a lack of maintenance), a contagion (e.g. representing a
computer virus in ICT systems), a targeted attack at an
important location (e.g. representing a terrorist attack) or a
spatial hazard (e.g. a flood or wind storm).
Step 4 is to analyse subsequent performance. This final stage
is to quantify the impact of each disruption on the infra-
structure network. A prerequisite to this is the selection of
appropriate metrics to quantify the change in performance of
the network. These might measure subsequent system size
(e.g. the number of remaining components), output (e.g. a
drop in total power supplied) or impact (e.g. the number of
people without service).
In this paper the three case studies are used to demonstrate
how this four-step process can be applied to analyse a range of
infrastructure performance issues. For clarity, one issue is
isolated in each case study. The first case study considers the
effects of the spatial properties of the infrastructure network,
the second incorporates resource flows through a network and
the third considers interdependency between two infrastructure
networks. In reality many infrastructures might include all
of these, and other, factors. However, by presenting three
different studies it is possible to explore the significance of
infrastructure performance to each factor separately and also
demonstrate the flexibility of network modelling for the large-
scale analysis of infrastructure systems.
3. Case study 1: using network topology to
identify vulnerability in binary networks
In case study 1 the authors demonstrate how a network model
of the North American air traffic network is created and
consider how the spatial structure of the network affects its
hazard tolerance. This network is subjected to three different
types of hazard and the change in performance/connectivity of
the network is quantified using graph theory metrics.
The North American air traffic network consists of 781 airports
and 3751 air routes (the data were obtained from Openflights
(2010)). To transform this air traffic network into a network
model the airports are modelled using nodes and the connecting
air routes are modelled using links.Using the networkmodel, the
degree of each node can be easily calculated, as it is equal to the
number of links (air routes) attached to it and from this the
degree distribution can be obtained (Figure 4(a)). From
Figure 4 it can be seen that the network forms a truncated
scale-free distribution, similar to other air traffic networks and,
as discussed previously, should be resilient to random hazard
but vulnerable to targeted attack.
The spatial degree distribution of these nodes (airports) has
also been plotted (Figure 4(b)). This distribution was obtained
by first calculating the geographical centre of the airports
(weighted by their degree) and then plotting the cumulative
degree of airports within a given radius. For the North
American air traffic network the geographical centre of the
network is located in Missouri, USA (approximately 190 km
west of St Louis). The spatial distribution of airports in the
North American air traffic network can be seen visually in
Figure 5. This figure also indicates the degree of the node (the
larger the circle the higher the degree) and the geographical
centre of the network. From Figure 5 it can be seen that the
high degree airports (or hub airports) are fairly well dispersed
throughout the North American states but are less evident in
northern Canada.
The resilience of this network is assessed by exposing it to three
different types of hazard to assess its hazard tolerance under a
range of conditions, as listed below.
& Random node failure – nodes are removed randomly from
the network.
& Degree attack – nodes are removed from the network in the
order of the highest to lowest degree. Previous studies have
used this attack strategy to simulate a targeted attack, that
is, the worst-case scenario.
& Spatial hazard – this hazard is based entirely upon the spatial
layout of the network (unlike the other two attack strategies,
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which are based upon topological measures). For both
networks the hazard starts in the geographical centre of the
North American air traffic network (Figure 4(b) and
Figure 5) and then grows outwards, removing nodes in order
of distance from the geographical centre.
Following failure, nodes are removed from the network, which
in turn will remove their connecting links (as it is not possible to
operate an air route to a closed airport). To assess the hazard
tolerance of the North American air traffic network to these
three hazard types the percentage of links removed have been
plotted against the percentage of nodes removed (Figure 6(a)).
For the spatial hazard the percentage of links removed have also
been plotted against the radius of the hazard, expressed as the
percentage of distance from the geographical centre of theNorth
American air traffic network to the edge of the network
(Figure 6(b)). Two network theory measures have also been
applied to the degraded networks to observe how the con-
nectivity changes when different hazards are applied. The
number of clusters is used to quantify how many unconnected
parts (or clusters) that the network has broken into and the
maximum cluster size (MCS) is used to indicate the size of the
largest cluster in the network (Figures 6(c) and 6(d)).
From these results, it is clear that the degree attack strategy
has the most devastating effect to the North American air
traffic network, both in terms of the higher percentage of
links removed for the same percentage of nodes removed
(Figure 6(a)) and a significantly lower MCS (Figure 6(c)). This
seems intuitive, given the degree distribution of the network
and considering the presence of a few highly connected nodes
in the network.
The results for the random node failure and the spatial hazard
to the network are broadly similar. This is due to the spatial
dispersion of high degree nodes in the North American air
traffic network, which can be seen in Figure 5. Therefore, to
remove one high degree node a large proportion of low degree
nodes must also be removed, which produces similar cluster
sizes to a random attack. This spatial dispersion arises from the
existence of a number of separate, densely populated areas
across the USA (for example, the two large population areas
on the east and west coasts). Given the spread of high degree
airports, a hazard that is seeded from the sparsely populated
centre of the USA is unlikely to be a worst-case location.
Shifting the spatial hazard over a location with more high
degree airports (e.g. along the east coast) the network’s
performance would be quite different, as has been shown for
the analysis of the European air traffic network by Wilkinson
et al. (2012).
4. Case study 2: using network topology to
identify vulnerability in a flow-based
network
The first case study does not consider passenger, freight or
aircraft movements. Instead, the effective proportion of the
network following a disruption was considered. Given the
availability of people, freight and aircraft movements, this
analysis could be extended to incorporate these issues using the
approach described in case study 2. Here, using a synthetic
network of n 5 15 nodes and 23 links for illustrative purposes,
flow is incorporated into the network analysis. In the previous
study degree was a suitable proxy for identifying important
nodes but when flow is also considered this ranking changes.
Flow around this network model is simulated using the
reduced complexity flow model of Dunn and Wilkinson
(2012). This model has been shown to represent the flows in
infrastructure networks in general, rather than focusing on the
flows in a specific type of infrastructure system. Therefore, the
present sample network could represent such networks as a
power grid or a water distribution system. To generate flow
around the network, one node is designated as the supply node
(in the case of a water distribution system this would be the
reservoir) and the remaining nodes as demand nodes (areas of
housing requiring a supply of water, for example). The value of
demand is assigned to the demand nodes in proportion to their
degree. Given suitable water infrastructure data this demand
would be the actual amount of service required by the node. It
is assumed that the supply node has enough capacity to meet
Figure 5. The location of real-world North American airports,
where the size of the node indicates its degree (i.e. the number of
air routes attached to it) (the larger the node the higher the
degree)
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the demand of the other nodes in the network (e.g. for a water
distribution network, it is assumed that the reservoir contains
enough water to supply the required demands).
In their study Dunn and Wilkinson (2012) were not consider-
ing weighted networks, and therefore set the weight of each
link to be equal (also equalling the resistances of each link in
the reduced complexity flow model). The weight of a link can
be used to represent different pipe lengths and/or resistances in
a water distribution network, for example. Here the present
authors consider the impact of flow on the ranking of
vulnerable components in the network and therefore alter the
weight of each link using two methods. The first method
assigns weight to the links based on their proximity to the
supply node (Figure 7(a)). A link that is connected to the
supply node will have a resistance of 1, links that are connected
to these links have a resistance of 2 and so on. In the second
method, values of weight/resistance are assigned to the links
randomly (Figure 7(b)).
The authors also use the concept of a roving supply node used
by Dunn and Wilkinson (2012). In the absence of a real-world
network this method is used to negate the effect that the
proximity of the supply node has to the demand nodes (i.e.
demand nodes directly connected to the supply node will not
only have their demand flowing through them but will also
transfer flow to those not directly connected to the supply
node). The vulnerability of each node is determined by
analysing the n – 1 possible demand node failures for each of
the n (n 5 15 here) possible supply node locations (210
simulations in total). The location of the supply node, vsi, is
fixed (e.g. at node i 5 1, as shown in Figure 7) and the flows
across the network as a function of this supply node location,
Q(vsi), are evaluated. A single demand node, vd, is removed and
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to three disruptive events
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the flows as a function of this diminished network, Q(vs,vd),
recalculated. Flows are subsequently calculated for each of the
n possible supply node locations and n – 1 single demand node
failures to understand the influence that the supply node can
have. The change in flow over the entire network, DQ, for the
ith supply node is calculated as the square root of the sum of
the squares of the change in flow across the remaining demand
nodes in the network.
1. DQ vsið Þ~
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiXn
j~1, j=1
Qj vsið Þ{Qj vsi,vdð Þ
 2r
To test the predictive skill of the model, DQ(vsi) is correlated
against the original flow, Qj (the flow through the demand
node prior to its removal), node degree (kj), weighted
betweenness centrality, C(vj), and a combined measure as
alternative metrics of network performance. The R2 from
these correlations is plotted in Figure 8. The betweenness
centrality of a node is equal to the number of shortest paths
between all other nodes that pass through the node
(Freeman, 1979; Lewis, 2009). As flow preferentially chooses
the shortest path between areas of supply and demand it
could be argued that the measure that accounts for the
shortest distance between pairs of other nodes indicates the
important nodes in the network. The C(vj) is calculated as
follows (Brandes, 2001)
2. C vj
 
~
X
vj=va=vb
c va; vb; vj
 
c va; vbð Þ
where c(va, vb) is the number of shortest paths between a pair
of nodes va and vb and c(va, vb, vj) is the number of shortest
paths from va to vb that pass vj. The final measure used is a
combined measure, CMj, developed by Dunn and Wilkinson
(2012), and again this measure is modified to account for the
weight/resistance of each link.
3. CMj~
Qj|C vj
 
vj
When the network is unweighted, Dunn and Wilkinson (2012)
showed that this combination of Qj (a physically based
measure) and betweenness centrality (a measure derived from
graph theory) improved the predictive skill at identifying
vulnerable nodes (Figure 8).
First, the skill of each method compared to the others is shown
for each position of the supply node (but the results are ranked
in descending order for the CMj to enable an easier comparison)
(Figures 8(a) and 8(c)). Each measure is also ranked individually
to identify the performance of each measure for ranking the
most vulnerable nodes (Figures 8(b) and 8(d)).
For the networks where the link weights/resistances were added
with distance from the supply node, the CMj appears to most
consistently identify the vulnerable nodes (Figure 8(a)). The
measures of Qj and C(vj) achieve better correlations for a few
positions of the supply node, but also noticeably weaker in most
other correlations. Ranking all the measures (Figure 8(b)) shows
that the degree of a node is not a good indication of the
vulnerability of that node, defined as the change in flow across
the network after its removal.
The combined measure appears to most effective, although not
consistent, at identifying the most important nodes for overall
network performance in both situations. Ranking these results,
for all measures, shows that C(vj) is not a good indicator of
node vulnerability, which therefore reduces the performance of
the combined measure.
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5. Case study 3: using network topology to
understand the impact of
interdependency on the performance of
binary networks
The previous two case studies assumed the networked
infrastructure was isolated from other infrastructure systems.
In many instances this is an appropriate simplifying assump-
tion to make. However, more recently approaches to networks
of networks analysis (i.e. modelling the dependence of one
system on another) have started to emerge (Gao et al., 2011;
Pederson et al., 2006). For example, the successful operation
on an electrical distribution system relies on a supply of water
for cooling and ICT systems for control and management.
The final case study seeks to understand the impact that
interdependency can have on the performance of intercon-
nected networks. As with the other two studies, the focus is on
a single issue of interest, interdependency, and so space or
flows are not considered.
Data on infrastructure interdependencies are not typically
available but, as described by Hall et al. (2013), this situation is
improving. With this in mind the present authors have developed
a simplified network model to explore cascading failure in
interdependent networks (Figure 9). First a number of isolated
networks are established, each representing an infrastructure
system. In this example two networks with random topology
have been produced using the approach outlined in step 1(b).
Interdependencies between networks are represented by a number
of links, each connecting a node in one network with a node in
another. Figure 9(a) shows an interdependent system that couples
two networks, A and B. The set of nodes in network A are
labelled (u1, u2, …), while the set of nodes in network B are
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Figure 8. The skill of four approaches to predicting network
performance where link resistances are (a, b) weighted with
distance or (c, d) assigned randomly. Results are ranked in
descending order according to R2, for (a, c) all measures are ranked
according to CMj, while for (b, d) each measure is ranked
independently
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labelled (v1, v2, …). An intra-network link is represented as a solid
line. An inter-network dependency is represented as a dashed line.
This model allows inter-network dependencies to be configured
along a few dimensions so as to provide the capacity to model
various network coupling modes. First, inter-network depen-
dencies can be generated according to different criteria,
including random connections, or co-related connections
according to spatial proximity or node degree. Second, the
dependencies between two networks can be customised with
three parameters, , F, K, D .. F specifies the extent of inter-
network dependencies, that is, the portion of nodes that a
network has and depends on another network. K specifies the
redundancy of dependencies, that is, the number of supporting
nodes that a node has from another network. D specifies the
directionality of dependencies. An interdependent link is bi-
directional if its inter-network dependencies are symmetric, for
example, when a node u in network A supports a node v in
network B, v also supports u. A link is uni-directional when these
dependencies are not mutual. That is, when a network A node,
u1, supports a network B node, v1, and v1 in turn may support a
different network A, node, u2. For example, the system in
Figure 9(a) is a bi-directional system, and a link between node u1
and v2 means that they mutually depend on each other.
To function properly, it is assumed that a dependent node
requires the availability of at least one of its supporting nodes
from each of its supporting networks. Failures happen in a
system in the following three cases. First, a node fails if it is
attacked directly. Second, a node fails if it is a dependent node
and it loses all of its supporting nodes from at least one of the
networks that it is supported by. Finally, in line with
percolation theory approaches (Albert and Barabasi, 2002), a
node fails if it is disconnected from the largest component of
the network to which it belongs (Figure 9).
An attack on network A is modelled that disables some
proportion of the network nodes directly and indirectly brings
about a cascade of additional node failures in network B as a
consequence of compromised interdependencies. Such addi-
tional node failures happen recursively and may result in
system failure extending far beyond the original attack
footprint. For the system in Figure 9(a), suppose that the
node u4 is attacked. When u4 fails, all links connected to u4
also fail. The failure of u4 also disconnects u1 from the giant
component of A, and therefore u1 fails. The failure of u4 and u1
triggers the failure of v5 (supported by u4) and v2 (supported by
u1). The failure of v5 disconnects v6 from the largest component
of network B, hence v6 fails. The resulting system at this stage
is shown in Figure 9(b). The failure of v6 causes the failure of
u6. As no further failure occurs, the system reaches a stabilised
state and the remaining functioning component of the system is
shown in Figure 9(c).
To measure the performance of such an interdependent system,
the connectedness of a system is calculated in terms of the
relative size of the largest component, P, of the final stabilised
system after the cascading failure.
4. P~
P
i N
i
TP
i N
i
0
where Ni0 is the numbers of nodes from network i before
cascading failure, and NiT are the number of nodes in the
largest components of network i after cascading failure. The
largest component can be an important quantity in, for
example, a communication network where it represents the
largest fraction of the network within which communication is
possible and hence is a measure of the effectiveness of the net-
work to provide its communication service. The aggregate per-
formance, IP, characterises the behaviour of an interdependent
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Figure 9. An interdependent system: (a) in its initial state, subject
to failure of node u4; (b) after the first iteration of cascading failure;
(c) the stabilised system
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system when network disruptions of different magnitude are
considered, and is calculated as the integral of P with respect to
attack size, q.
5. IP~
ð1
0
P qð Þ
The larger P and IP, the more nodes remain in the largest
connected component of a system, the better the system
performs and the easier the system is to recover or repair.
The study was carried out over systems that couple two random
networks, A and B, each comprising 10 000 nodes, and with an
average degree of 4. Network disruption was initiated by
removing a randomly selected fraction q of network A nodes.
Figure 10 plots relative size, P, of giant components as function
of, q, the size of initial disruption to network A, when
F 5 1?0 and K 5 2 for a bi-directional system. The results are
compared against that of a system in which networks A and B
are isolated from each other. It shows that an interdependent
system has smaller P and therefore is more vulnerable than an
isolated system. While an isolated network undergoes contin-
uous transition at the failure threshold qc (the point when a
system collapses or P becomes zero), an abrupt transition is
observed at qc for an interdependent system. That is, P at qc is
non-zero, and abruptly drops to zero when q . qc (Figure 10).
These results demonstrate that the interdependent system is most
vulnerable when K5 1 and F5 1?0, that is, when both networks
are fully connected to each other and each node has only one
supporting node from the other network. The performance of the
interdependent system improves when the number of supporting
nodes that a node has is increased (i.e. increasing K) or the
extent a network depends on another network is decreased (i.e.
decreasing F). When either K is sufficiently large or F is
sufficiently small, the performance of an interdependent system
approaches that of a system in which each of its sub-networks is
isolated from or independent of the others (Figure 11).
Figure 11 shows the performance difference, IPbi 2 IPuni, of
uni-directional and bi-directional systems, where IPbi and IPuni
are aggregate performance of a bi-directional and a uni-
directional system, respectively. It can be seen that a uni-
directional system is more vulnerable than a bi-directional
system, and the bigger F or/and smaller K are, the more
remarkable is the difference of performance between a bi-
directional and a uni-directional system. The main reason for the
worse performance of a uni-directional system is that it presents
more possibilities for the existence of longer dependency chains
than a bi-directional system. These dependency chains run back
and forth between the interconnected networks. A failure of one
node compromises the robustness of all downstream nodes in the
dependency chain, potentially triggering their failure and a
possible cascade (described by Fu et al., 2012).
6. Conclusions
Modern infrastructure systems are complex, interconnected
networks. In this paper the authors have demonstrated the
applicability of network theory on three different case studies.
These examples have shown that the resilience of an infra-
structure system is sensitive to a number of factors, including the
& spatial distribution of infrastructure nodes (such as airports
and power stations)
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Figure 10. Comparison of the performance of interdependent
systems against isolated systems
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& type and magnitude of disruptive event to which the
infrastructure is exposed (whether it is random, targeted
or a spatially coherent hazard)
& degree of connectivity in an infrastructure network
& number of connections between infrastructure networks
and their directionality
& capacity, and other properties, of the links that connect nodes.
In the first case study network graph theory was used to assess
the vulnerability of the North American air traffic network to
spatial and topological hazards and it was demonstrated that
the degree attack strategy had the most devastating effect. For
spatial hazards this network was found to have a similar spatial
vulnerability to a random hazard. This is because the high
degree hubs in the network are geographically distributed
relatively evenly and therefore a spatial hazard must become
relatively large before it has a significant impact on the
network. In the second case study various network graph
theory measures, flow based metrics and combinations of these
were tested to better identify vulnerable nodes in a weighted
network. In this example it was demonstrated that at times
flow-based measures were superior and at other times graph
theory measures were superior, but in general a combination of
the two had the best predictive capabilities. Finally, a system of
interdependent networks was analysed and it was demon-
strated that an interdependent system is most vulnerable when
both networks are fully connected to each other in a uni-
directional manner and each node has only one supporting
node from the other network. This case study highlighted the
need to identify and characterise interdependencies and, where
appropriate, add in redundancy or other mitigation measures.
While the authors recognise that the characterisation of the
reliability of individual components in a system is important to
understanding its behaviour, an earth systems engineering
approach that considers system-level interactions is essential for
understanding impacts on the wider environment. A priority for
future work should be to identify, for different infrastructure
design problems, the right balance between the computational
efficiency of network (or other broad scale) analyses and the full
representation of the physical processes. The case studies presented
here show the potential for network theory to address a wide range
of challenges such as broad scale risk assessment, national
infrastructure planning and the development of adaptation plans,
as well as understanding the potential impact of cascading impacts
from random failure, spatial hazards such as floods, malicious
attack or fragilities due to interdependencies. The authors therefore
conclude that systems-scale analysis of infrastructure networks
must be an important stage in infrastructure design, planning and
management in the context of resilience and sustainability.
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